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From 'Integral State' to 'Integral World Economic Order': Towards a Neo-Gramscian Cultural International Political Economy

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From 'Integral State' to 'Integral World Economic Order': Towards a Neo-Gramscian Cultural International Political Economy

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1. Introduction

Gramsci's approach to the world is anchored firmly in Marxism. But it also departs from more traditional Marxist arguments that emphasise the determining role of forces of production and/or adopt a narrow conception of the relations of production. Gramsci sought to overcome these technologically reductionist and 'economistic' tendencies by highlighting the importance of ideas/modes of thought and by adopting a far more extensive account of the relations of production. He recognised that ideas interact with material forces and that the ideal and the material are both necessary in creating hegemony and securing the structural integration of a social formation. Hegemony involves 'consensus armoured by coercion' and is materialized in a 'historic bloc' that reflects an historically constituted correspondence between the economic base and its ethico-political superstructure. Cox and other neo-Gramscian IPE scholars have transferred Gramsci's account of hegemony and the historic bloc from national states to international relations. Thus, whereas Gramsci's own work was mainly concerned with the relationships between consent and coercion, culture and politics, in the nation-state and only occasionally considered transnational relations and broader geopolitical issues, Cox (1987) and Gill (1991) are more concerned with the nature and dynamic of 'world orders' and tend to allocate a subordinate position to most nation-states in this regard. They relate the concepts of 'production' and 'social forces' to 'states' and inter-state relations in 'world orders' and interpret 'historic blocs' in terms of the formation of a transnational bourgeoisie. They sought to analyze a class-based, capitalist world order that was primarily structured by the dominant mode of production.

2. From 'Integral State' to 'Integral World Economic Order'

Although such neo-Gramscian approaches provide valuable insights into the formation of the transnational order, they fail to develop the full implications of Gramsci's concern with the complex articulation of the cultural and material in the explanation of power and hegemony. In particular, I suggest a 'cultural IPE' approach to the understanding of the world economic order that adopts a more 'inclusive' or 'integral' analysis of the same issues examined by the Coxian school. Thus I develop the notion of an 'integral world economic order' by analogy with Gramsci's idea of the 'state in its inclusive sense' or the 'integral state' (political society + civil society) and with Jessop's account of the 'economy in its inclusive sense' or 'l'economia integrale' (accumulation regime + mode of regulation).

An 'integral world economic order' can be understood as a 'production order + civil society' that is characterized by a relatively stable structured coherence whose dominance is reproduced on a global scale. This structured coherence is formed
through the intermeshing of the hegemony of production and the production of hegemony in mutually supportive ways that limit the contradictions inherent in capitalist production within and secure a limited measure of social integration. The hegemony of production refers to the relative dominance of a production order or accumulation regime (e.g., Fordism) within the overall structure of a global social formation and to the mechanisms that secure and reproduce this relative dominance. Conversely, the production of hegemony involves the processes and mechanisms in and through which 'political, intellectual, and moral leadership' is secured in and across the differentiated and dispersed organizations and institutions of civil society and articulated with the apparently autonomous production order. The interdependence of these two spheres of structural and processual activities is crucial to understanding the particular form and content of the hegemony that typifies a specific historical epoch. This means that one has to study in detail the political, economic, and cultural relations between the discourses and practices of production order and those of groups and institutions of civil society.

Coxian IPE, especially in its earlier formulations (1987), focuses more on the 'hegemony of production' and, therefore, tends towards economism with a focus on structural integration rather than issues of ideas, agency and identities. Preliminary attempts to move beyond these limitations can be found in work by Gill on 'disciplinary liberalism' (1995), Rupert on 'producing hegemony' (1995), Steger on 'globalism' (2002), and de Goede on 'finance' (2003). This chapter takes these ideas further by arguing that the concern with 'production of hegemony' in the wider civil society means that Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and Foucault’s concept of discourse are very helpful in approaching the differentiated formations, networks and relations of contemporary movement that permeate various levels of the global, regional, national, and local. Given their importance, detailed discussion on Gramsci/neo-Gramscians and Foucault will be pursued under the 'cultural turn' and permeation of hegemony to the various levels will be covered under the 'scalar turn'.

3. The 'Cultural' and 'Scalar Turns' in IPE

The 'cultural turn' is commonly reduced to a concern with discourse, meaning, identity and representation (Barnett 1998: 380; Valentine 2001: 166-7). But this is insufficient to map a cultural IPE that can address macro- and micro-power. Sayer’s distinction between uncritical and critical turns is useful here (1998). An uncritical turn involves the kind of culturalism that reduces social and political life to discursive texts or text-like objects and attends only to their 'construing' or signifying qualities. This approach focuses on the micro-political at the expense of the macro-structural. In contrast, the critical turn is concerned not only with 'construal' but also with 'construction', i.e., with the articulation of the cultural and the material as well as asking critical questions about capitalist society. Such an analysis is typically post-disciplinary in spirit insofar as it draws on concepts and arguments from several disciplines without regard to disciplinary boundaries (Jessop and Sum 2001). In proposing a cultural IPE that can address both macro- and micro-power, this chapter clearly supports the critical cultural turn and advocates a constructivist approach within 'shouting distance' of materialism and neo-Gramscianism. However, as can be seen from the contrasting approaches of Foucault, Hall, Laclau and Mouffe,
Fairclough, Jessop, de Certeau as well as Miller and Rose, there are many ways to get within 'shouting distance'.

3.1 The Critical 'Cultural Turn': From Adding Foucault to Gramsci to Mixing Foucault and Gramsci

Foucault and Gramsci share an understanding of how power operates ‘within the systems and subsystems of social relations, in the interactions, in the microstructures that inform the practices of everyday life’ (Holub 1992: 200). They both seek to move away from a strongly institutionalist, juridico-political, and state-centric account of power and its exercise. They are both concerned in different ways with discourse and discursive formations, with the articulation of power and knowledge, with hegemony and common sense, and with consent and coercion. They are both interested in the embedding and embodying of power in everyday routines and the role of specific institutions and apparatuses in this regard. It is hardly surprising, then, that scholars have recently attempted to ‘improve’ Gramsci’s work on hegemony by adding ideas from Foucault’s work. For example, Gill added the term ‘disciplinary’ to ‘neoliberalism’ (1995) but did not go on to examine the micro ‘technologies of power’ of the neoliberal project. De Goede (2003) hinted at the disciplinary and performative aspects of finance but failed to link micro-power back to the macro-hegemony of consent; let alone their embedding in social relations (and selectivity). In general, whilst this addition of Foucault to Gramsci is tempting, it must also be used with care. For there are actually some important differences between Foucault and Gramsci.

On the one hand, for Foucault, discourse is already power and there is no point or need to look behind it for another source of power. Power is immanent and relational. It emerges from specific disciplinary techniques and truth regimes, i.e., from specific articulations of power and knowledge. Technologies of power are accorded theoretical priority over the agents responsible for implementing them as well as over the subjects (or individual bodies and populations) who are disciplined by them. Discursive power forms the subject, but the subject rarely appears as an agent, let alone a centred agent. In addition, for Foucault, wherever there is power, there is resistance. But this is said to be rooted in a generic ‘plebeian instinct’ of resistance rather than being grounded in specific material positions or specific identities. In this sense, Foucault tends to focus either on the surface manifestations of power relations or on their underlying technologies; he cannot provide us with a clear account of the actual effectivity of discourses or disciplines in some situations rather than others. Thus, while we find occasional references to how the exercise of power in different sites comes to be strategically codified or to how capitalist relations of production privilege some disciplinary techniques over others, Foucault’s real interest is in the micro-capillaries of power in everyday life. In this sense, as Marsden has noted, Foucault can tell us something about the how of power but is far less informative about the why of power and its contribution to particular forms of social domination (Marsden 1999:149).

On the other hand, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is premised on quite specific modalities and apparatuses of power operating on particular subjects with specific social identities and material interests. He is not interested in developing a
transhistorical account of power but is primarily concerned with the nature of power in modern capitalist social formations where mass politics have developed. It is certainly the case that both Gramsci and Foucault treat power as relational. But, whereas Gramsci grounds the exercise of power in specific material apparatuses (political and ideological as well as economic) and specific social practices, Foucault is more interested in technologies of power that can be applied across different social fields. Likewise, whereas Foucault rarely concedes that there is an overall structural coherence to social formations apart from the generalization of specific technologies of power, Gramsci is especially concerned with the question of how an inherently unstable and conflictual social formation acquires a certain degree of system and social integration. This is why he puts so much emphasis on hegemony, the formation of power blocs, the construction of historic blocs, and so forth. Far from subscribing to the automatism of a mechanical base-superstructure relation, Gramsci adopts a more fluid and interactive understanding of the reciprocal relations among the economic, political, ideological and cultural spheres.

Given these differences, this chapter rejects any attempt to combine Foucault to Gramsci as if they were wholly commensurable and complementary. But it does not fully exclude a careful transformation and articulation of some of their concepts and arguments to address a specific set of problems in cultural IPE. To see what is at stake here, I first examine previous attempts to mix Foucault and Gramsci. These can be loosely grouped here into two broad tendencies: foucauldizing Gramsci and gramscianizing Foucault (see diagram 1). At the expense of ignoring other scholarly influences and mediations, Hall and Laclau and Mouffe can be seen as belonging to the first group; and Fairclough, Jessop and de Certeau can be placed in the second.

3.1.1 Foucauldizing Gramsci

Hall's work in 'cultural studies' started out from Gramsci's ideas of hegemony. Instead of concentrating on the relationship between hegemony and ideology, he focuses on the elaboration of ideology in language(s) as well as the cultural function of these ideological processes (Hall, 1982). More specifically, he asked how ideological meanings/discourses are diversely constituted and contested in (popular) culture as well as how they are naturalized as common sense. Under the influence of Raymond Williams and a broad appropriation of Foucault's connection between discourse and power from below, Hall's bottom-up formulation of ideology regards popular culture as a site of both containment and resistance (Hall 1981: 227). It is the ground on which the transformations of social meanings are worked out. In seeking to distance himself from orthodox Marxism, he notes that such ideological struggles should not be reduced to class struggle.

This distancing from orthodox Marxism is taken much further (to the point of affirming itself as post-Marxist) in Laclau and Mouffe's work. Their discourse-analytical approach is strongly influenced by Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Derrida. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985), they attempt to break with economism by resorting to a Wittgensteinian idealism of language games (Brenans 1999: 21) at the expense of any engagement with material reality. Indeed, the crucial role of hegemony rests on the 'unfixity' of social relations -- the lack of any stable sites of material determination
or privileged subject positions. There are no fixed subject positions or privileged foundations of hegemonic domination. On the contrary, for them, discourses rather than materiality constitute the subject of hegemony. The open character of subject positions is constituted in and through discursive articulation and not material forces. Thus, there is no real economic exploitation that exists whether or not it is perceived as such -- at best (or worst) there are only perceptions of economic oppression that are construed through particular discourses that define specific subject positions and antagonisms. Agreeing with Foucault (among others), they also claim that no one has a prerogative on truth -- truth is whatever is currently hegemonic (an even more discursively defined notion than Foucault's "truth regimes") despite the ever-present tendency to resist. Discourses thus constitute the subjects (both active and passive) of hegemony. Although their initial starting point is the Gramscian notion of hegemony, Gramsci's concern with materiality as well as discursivity eventually disappears from their theoretical purview so that hegemony becomes little more than 'discursive idealism' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 117) or 'discursive totality' (Brenans 1999: 19).

3.1.2 Gramscianizing Foucault

For many neo-Gramscians, Laclau and Mouffe's approach to hegemony loses its purchase on reality as soon as it is divorced from serious engagement with materiality. Certainly their denial that one can say anything about the material world outside and beyond discourse would block the development of the sort of cultural IPE of interest here. Their 'empty ontology' (Jessop 1990) precludes an understanding of the contradictory and conflictual dynamic of capitalist social formations as constituted by the reciprocal interweaving and interaction of the material and discursive. An alternative to such attempts to 'foucauldize Gramsci' is the 'gramscianization of Foucault'. Fairclough's critical discourse analysis is a good starting point.

Fairclough builds on Gramsci's and Foucault's respective analytics of power. As a critical discourse analyst, he examines discourse not only in its own term but also in its articulation to power relations. This means, in particular, that he analyzes how power relations shape the production of discourse, mediate discursive effects, and are produced in part through the world of discursive practices (1992). It is clear that Fairclough does not reduce the social world to a discursive construction. Rather, he argues for a dialectical relation between discourse and materiality. Thus he examines: a) the actual text; b) the discursive practices (i.e., the process involved in speaking, reading, writing and hearing); and c) the larger social context that bears upon the text and discursive practices. This enables him to establish the links between the micro and macro phenomena. On the micro level, text analysis involves a formal examination of values in the text and the ways in which the text is being interpreted in accordance with rules and norms used to produce, receive and interpret the text. Competing interpretations of the text are part of social struggles in and through which participants with diverse capacities seek to control the discourse. Participants do not enter these struggles on an equal footing due to inequalities or asymmetries in material and discursive resources and structures of domination. This affects the capacities of different actors to represent and constitute the social relations to which they are oriented (Fairclough 1995: 6; Chouliaraki and Fairclough
1999: 26). In short, Fairclough's approach locates discourse in social practice by identifying its ideological roles and the network of power relations in which it is embedded at the macro level (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 24, 68). He also explains how certain discursive practices may lead the less powerful or powerless to see the world through the interpretative frame of the powerful so that the latter's ideology is not only dominant structurally but also tends to become hegemonic through its consensual character.

Diagram 1 From Foucauldizing Gramsci to Gramscianizing Foucault

Laclau and Hall Fairclough Jessop de Certeau
Mouffe

Foucauldizing Gramscianizing
Gramsci Foucault

(Source: Author's own compilation)

Relatively speaking, Fairclough's critical discourse analysis is more discursive-material than it is material-discursive -- discursive analysis takes priority over the material. Conversely, Jessop's strategic-relational approach (hereafter SRA), at least in its early stages (1982, 1990), is more material-discursive. I interpret material here in terms of Jessop's analysis of the strategically selective nature of the structural contexts in which agents exist and act, i.e., structures privilege some strategies over others. In this regard, structures are treated analytically as strategic in their form, content and operation; and actions are treated analytically as structured, more or less context-sensitive, and structuring. The SRA involves examining what Jessop terms 'structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and structurally-oriented strategic calculation'. The former concept refers to how a given structure may privilege some actors, some discourses, some identities, and some strategies over others. The latter highlights how actors orient their strategies in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture, their strategic calculation about their 'objective' interests, and the recursive selection of strategies through reflection and learning. Together these two concepts enable us to examine both the path-dependent and the path-shaping nature of hegemonic transformation. For, the reflexive reorganization of structural configurations is subject to structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities; and the recursive selection of strategies depends in turn on individual or organizational learning capacities and on the 'experiences' resulting from the pursuit of different strategies in different conjunctures.

Jessop extends this analysis in later work by integrating discursive elements (e.g., economic imaginaries and positionings) into the SRA so that he can explore the co-evolution of discursive and extra-discursive processes and their conjoint impact in specific contexts (Jessop 2004). Drawing on the three basic evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention, he formulates three broad claims.
Ontologically, discourse contributes to the overall constitution of specific social objects and social subjects and, *a fortiori*, to their co-constitution and co-evolution in wider ensembles of social relations. For our purposes this implies that, in the production-of-hegemony approach, economic objects should be seen as socially constructed, historically specific, more or less socially (dis)embedded in broader networks of social relations and institutional ensembles, more or less embodied ('incorporated' and embrained), and in need of continuing social 'repair' work for their reproduction. Epistemologically, a material-discursive SRA denies the facticity of the subject-object duality. Again, applied to a neo-Gramscian cultural IPE, this implies the co-constitution of subjects and objects. Moreover, while eschewing reductionist approaches to economic analysis, it would stress the materiality of social relations and highlights the constraints involved in processes that operate 'behind the backs' of the relevant agents. As such, it would be especially concerned with the structural properties and dynamics resulting from such material interactions. In this way the SRA and, *a fortiori*, a production-of-hegemony could escape the 'pure social constructionism and voluntarist vacuity of certain lines of discourse analysis, which seem to imply that agents can will anything into existence in and through an appropriately articulated discourse' (Jessop 2004).

Substantively, this approach takes economic imaginaries not as ‘arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed’ (Gramsci 1971: 376-7), but as corresponding, albeit partially, to real material forces in the existing international political economy. There is a wide variation of imaginaries at the macro- and meso-levels develop as economic, political, and intellectual forces in genre chains seek to (re)define specific economic activities as subjects, sites, and stakes of economic competition and/or as objects of regulation and to articulate strategies, projects and visions. Among the main forces involved in the genre chains are international organizations (e.g., IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization), international fora (e.g., World Economic Forum), states, think tanks, consultancy firms, philanthropic organizations (e.g., Ford Foundation), governmental bureaucracies, business federations, chambers of commerce, transnational corporations, financial organizations, media, and NGOs. They are crucial intermediaries in (re-)structuring of capitalist hegemony and have four general discursive aspects. First, they are sources of discursive innovation and emergence is a source of variation that feeds into social transformation. Second, these discursive conditions affect the differential reproduction and transformation of other social groups, organizations, and institutions. Third, they also affect the selection and retention of the discursive features of social phenomena. Actors recursively select discourses and discursive practices that tend to reduce inappropriate variation and to secure the 'requisite variety' (constrained excessive heterogeneity rather than simple uniformity) that supports the structural coherence of economic activities. Fourth, they also mobilize elite and/or popular support behind competing imaginaries. These forces tend to manipulate power and construct knowledge to secure recognition of the boundaries and geometries relevant for the remaking of hegemony. These actors have also general structural aspects. They seek to develop new structural and organizational forms that will help to institutionalize these boundaries and geometries in an
appropriate fix that can displace and/or defer capital’s inherent contradictions and crisis-tendencies in the international political economy. Although any given economic imaginary is only ever partially constituted, relatively successful economic imaginaries do have their own performative, constitutive force in the material world. In short, discourses and their related genre chains can generate variation, have selective effects, and contribute to the differential retention and/or institutionalization of social relation (Jessop 2004).

Borrowing from Jessop's strategic-relational approach and his reworking of the discursive-material coevolution (e.g., variation, selection, retention and reinforcement), this chapter, at the risk of being formalistic, presents five crucial moments in a cultural IPE understanding of the production of hegemony. More specifically, these moments seek to highlight the discursive selectivity (Hay 1996: 253-77) in the (re-)making of dominant common sense in the international political economy (see box 1 and diagram 2).

Box 1 Five Discursive-Selective Moments in the Production of Hegemony

Discursive-strategic moment

• As structural circumstances change, networks of actors seek to remake economic constraints and opportunities;
• They provide a repertoire of discourses that involve struggles to reconstitute objects of governance; and
• Genre chains that promote specific discourses emerge.

Structurally-inscribed strategic selective moment (as applied to discourses)

• Constrained by prevailing structural constraints and social relations, actors in the genre chains have variable scope for strategic calculations and actions; and
• They select and privilege certain objects of governance (e.g., competitiveness, transparency, corporate social responsibility) and represent them as strategies through filter in/out or articulate certain symbols

(Inter-)discursively-selective moment

• These genre chains impose limits on what can be articulated with what across different discourses. This guides the combination of certain symbols that contribute to the support or reinvention of the hegemonic objects, imaginaries and projects;
• Genre chains are mediated through key actors -- in the present case, these include IMF, World Bank, WTO, World Economic Forum, states, think tanks, consultancy firms, philanthropic organizations, government bureaucracies, business federations, chamber of commerce, standard-
setting agencies, financial organizations, service-oriented NGOs, business media, business schools, consultancy firms, etc.;

- These actors participate in co-constructing, problematizing, re-phrasing, translating and technicalizing the ideologically-sophisticated theories into common-sensical codes for wider public dissemination and consumption; and

- Such genre chains operate in part through disciplinary technologies that articulate or constrain possible discourses and imaginations. Knowledging technologies include:

  - Forms of interpretation (e.g., economic talk, moral/ethical talk, technical talk, inclusion/exclusion talk).
  - Modes of subjectification (e.g., discursive positions as experts and scholars).
  - Regimes of notation and documentation (e.g., lists, records, charts, indexes, codes).
  - Technologies of control in and through naming, metaphorizing, categorizing, ordering, classifying and hierarchizing

- These technologies of knowledge control actors and practices by conforming to standards and captivating with the myth of success through self- and other-scrutiny.

**Moment in the remaking dominant subjectivities and practices (subject-bodily constitution and performance regulation)**

- These discursive practices reconfigure subjects and redefine subjectivities;
- Subjects refashion subjectivities through reflecting on and valuing new identities so that their bodies and emotions are congruent with the new 'word order' constituted by hegemonic imaginary and associated norms;
- These forms of embodiedness privileges the values, skills, and actions required in the world economic order, shape the motives and desires to impel appropriate behaviours, and foster the modes of consciousness and subjectivity (e.g., being competitive, entrepreneurial, creative, mobile, consumerist, indulgent and cool) that typically help to sustain and reproduce this order;
- Agencies perform and repeat these subjectivities through mundane institutional events (e.g., meetings, formal dinners, seminars) and routine practices (e.g., travelling, job-searching, consuming, managing projects, setting standards) of everyday life.

**Moment in re-embedding social relations**

- Although contested, the resonant discourses, subjectivities, and enacted routines get regularized in strategies, institutions and governance;
- The greater the range and scale of sites in which resonant discourses and practices are retained and the strategies are promoted, the greater is the
potential for effective institutionalization and integration into ongoing patterns of structured coherence; and

- The resultant forms of governance are asymmetric with the effect that uneven power relations remain (e.g., class, gender, ethnicity, place, etc.).
Diagram 2 Production of (Counter-)Hegemony on Different Scales

Production of hegemony

Tactical counter-hegemonic practices (micro)

Re-embedding practices and social relations

Counter-hegemonic discourses on different scales (macro)

Depending on prevailing structural constraints, certain objects are selected that support the reinvention of hegemonic discourses. The genre chains operate through disciplinary technologies in constituting the subject.

Remaking subjectivities and regulating performance

Subhegemonic translation of hegemonic discourses

Based on materiality and selectively reinforce institutional practices

Struggles to provide repertoire of ideologically-inscribed discourses for development of political, intellectual and moral leadership

Ideologically-inscribed discourses/Ideologically-positioned discourses

Hegemony of production

Institutions

Mediated via structural coupling and co-evolution

Material power

(Source: Author’s own compilation)
Key:
Five discursively-selective moments
A - Discursive-strategic moment
B - Structurally-inscribed strategic selective moment
C - (Inter-)Discursively selective moment
D - Moment in the re-making of subjectivities and practices
E - Moment in re-embedding of social relations

New social relations can be reinforced insofar as: a) devices exist that privilege these discourses and their associated practices; and b) also filter out contrary discourses and practices. This can involve both discursive selectivity (genre chains, identities and performance) and material selectivity (the privileging of certain dominant sites of discourse and strategies of strategic actors and their modes of calculation about their 'objective interests, and the recursive selection of these strategies). Such mechanisms recursively strengthen appropriate genres, performance, and strategies and selectively eliminate inappropriate alternatives and are most powerful where they operate across many sites in a social formation to promote complementary sub-hegemonic discourses within the wider social ensemble on different scales.

These innovations notwithstanding, Jessop's work on hegemony still tends to concentrate on reproduction rather than resistance. But we can turn to de Certeau to find ways to insert agents' struggles and the creativity of everyday life into the SRA. In the Practice of Everyday Life (1984), de Certeau argues that everyday life is the site of countless tactics of resistance to broader power relations. Whereas the dominant culture moves through 'strategies', practices that assume a base of operations, marginals must use 'tactics' - 'calculated actions determined by the lack of a proper locus'. This space of the tactic is the place of the other. 'Whatever one wins through tactics must be surrendered; any victory is only temporary' (de Certeau 1984: 36-7). Thus, tactics cannot in themselves produce major structural change -- except insofar as they stimulate the powerful to engage in pre-emptive reform to counteract such tactics. Nonetheless, tactics involve a continuing trial-and-error search in the 'practice of everyday life' for weak points and angles of attack.

De Certeau's work offers a means to enrich Jessop's approach and to re-interpret Foucault's account of resistance. Harris, in fact, claims that de Certeau can be used to gramscianize Foucault (1992: 156) in terms of adding resistance to Foucault's disciplinary power. More specifically, de Certeau highlighted the two-sided nature of Foucault's technology of power by distinguishing between strategies of groups with an institutional base from which to exercise power; and the tactics of those subject to that power and who, lacking a base for acting continuously and legitimately, manoeuvre and improvise micropolitical resistance. This theory of strategies and tactics can articulate the relation of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic power in Foucault and to introduce a way of thinking about the tensions within technology of power. Despite de Certeau's contribution towards our understanding of these
tensions, he, in contrast with Gramsci, insists on the absolute ontological distinction between strategies and tactics. Gramsci introduces the key distinction between 'war of manoeuvre' and 'war of position' and emphasizes the dialectical relation between them. In this sense, while de Certeau may provide useful insights into the character of tactics (or 'war of manoeuvre'), he offers no account of how one modality of war can lead into or complement the other. In this regard, Gramsci's insight can avoid the rigidities of de Certeau's dichotomy between strategies and tactics.

3.2 The 'Scalar Turn': From Global to Local and the Scales in Between

Contributions to the 'cultural turn' in political economy of the kind reviewed above have often been insensitive to the question of scale. Some scholars concentrate on the global level (Cox 1987; Gill and Law 1988) and others on the national and the local (Jessop 1990; de Certeau 1984). Drawing on work from new geography (Harvey 1996; Smith 1992; Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1999; Perkmann and Sum 2002; Jessop 2002), I now highlight the importance of scales and argue for a cultural IPE that is sensitive to this issue.

The scalar question concerns the ways in which different scales - the global, regional, national and local - relate to each other. Most work in geography, history, anthropology, and IPE has tended to focus on processes and patterns at one scale, e.g., either the national/local or the global. Cox and a number of neo-Gramscian scholars prioritize the 'global' and this is reflected in their naming of their object of analysis as the 'world order'. Germain and Kenny (1998) question whether Gramsci's work, which they claim is more focused on the politics of individual European states, can be transferred to the international/global level. Although Gramsci's work certainly does tend to have a nation-state focus, he is also aware of the interplay of forces at international, national and regional levels. According to Gramsci,

'International relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and historically unique combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations. This relation between international forces and national forces is further complicated by the existence within every State of several structurally diverse territorial sectors, with diverse relations of force at all level' (1971: 182).

In this regard, Jessop (2005) claims that Gramsci can be regarded as an acutely spatially sensitive thinker and that he was aware of the scalar aspects of the emerging geoeconomic and geopolitical world order.

4. Towards a Neo-Gramscian Cultural IPE: Production of (Counter-)Hegemony

In order to develop a neo-Gramscian cultural IPE, we should take both the 'cultural' and 'scalar' turns seriously. We can thereby study the world economic order in a more inclusive sense. Given the complexity of this issue, this chapter concentrates on the production of hegemony by referring to the mechanisms in and through which
hegemony is secured by organic intellectuals in and across different international institutions (e.g., IMF, WTO, World Bank, World Economic Forum, standard-setting agencies), states, and civil-society (e.g., service-oriented NGOs, business media, banks, consultancy firms) more broadly. With regard to civil society, Gramsci sees it both as a space for the consolidation and normalization of domination, and as a sphere of resistance which could lead to counter-hegemonic projects in a 'war of position' for cultural hegemony. The potential co-existence of hegemony and counter-hegemony in the wider civil society is one of the main foci of cultural IPE and leads to its interest in how discourses and scales mediate the production and contestation of hegemony.

4.1 Production of Hegemony

The production of hegemony can be understood as an amalgam of discursive and material processes articulated on different scales. In general, there is no primary scale at which these hegemonic identities are best constructed. Instead the most suitable scale at a particular moment for representing a particular image of the 'world order' is historically contingent (Brenner 1997). This does not mean that the choice of scale can be 'arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed' (Gramsci 1971: 362).

Drawing on Jessop and Fairclough (see above), I propose a strategic-relational approach to genre chains. For Fairclough, genre chains regularly link different genres of discourse together and involve systematic transformations from genre to genre (2003: 31-32). It is important to consider the role of specific networks of actors in linking genres as well as the rules governing specific genres and the scope that they offer for different forms of intertextual articulation. In general, although networks of strategic actors in genre chains are constrained by structural asymmetries of power, this does not preclude some variation in the scope for strategic calculation and action (see Box 1). Organic intellectuals occupying privileged positions as spokesmen, statesmen, experts, leaders, and scholars. They are not only organic to international institutions, states and civil society that they are socialized, but also 'organic' in the sense that they help to organize, and this include organizing language and discourse Ives 2004: 45). More specifically, organic intellectuals during neo-liberal globalization organize and privilege 'market' and 'competitiveness' discourses that support or reinvent the hegemonic codes and filter out notions and discourses that oppose or weaken these codes. Significant examples of marketized symbols are 'privatization', 'competitiveness', 'globalization', and 'corporate social responsibility'. The discourses implicit in these codes are co-constructed by political and economic agents at different scales and in different sites. These vectors of power include international organizations (e.g., IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization), international fora (e.g., World Economic Forum), states, and civil society organizations (e.g., think tanks, philanthropic organizations, business federations, chambers of commerce, financial organizations, service-oriented NGOs, professional firms, lay investors, and media corporations). They participate in framing, co-constructing, negotiating, translating and moulding disconnected 'common sense' into 'good sense' and 'collective will' for wider public dissemination and consumption (see diagram 2).
These 'good sense', which aligned public interest with interest of the elite, is relayed, distributed and repeated by mainstream global, regional and national media - especially the business sections of newspapers, business magazines, news/commentary on television and radio, expert interviews, films, books, reports, web pages as well as charts, codes and indexes. Together, organic intellectuals in these chains produce and distribute hegemonic frames (e.g., 'trade as an engine for democracy') that limit number of choices for public response from which the public then forms an opinion (Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 81).

Selective representations of this kind by the different institutional and civil-society actors in the genre chains may shape 'popular collective will' and tend towards hegemony. For Gramsci, the formation of hegemony involves:

‘… analyzing it in all its molecular phases ... [interaction] repeated an infinite number of times and which in their gigantic unity represent this work from which is born a collective will of a certain level of homogeneity …’ (Gramsci translated by and cited in Thibault 1991: 212)

In this regard, hegemony emerges on the back of innumerable 'molecular phases' and interactions 'repeated an infinite number of times'. These molecular interactions, in turn, combine to produce a 'unstable equilibrium of compromise' from which emerges a 'collective will of a certain level of homogeneity'. Also focusing on the legitimation of government, Rose refers to these 'molecular processes' as 'translation processes of various sort [through which] linkages are assembled between political agencies, public bodies, economic, legal, medical, social and technical authorities, and the aspirations, judgements and ambitions of formally autonomous entities, be these firms, factories, pressure groups, families or individuals' (Rose 1999: 48).

Anchored in the sophisticated, the mundane and the technical, Gramsci's 'unstable equilibrium of compromise' and Rose's 'linkages' are visible and interactive. Adopting a discourse perspective, we can glimpse how such unities or linkages can be created in and through discursive practices. Thus the many representations of the neoliberal world order operate in part through disciplinary technologies such as forms of interpretation (e.g., economic talk, moral/ethical talk, inclusion talk), modes of subjectification (e.g., discursive positions as experts), regimes of notation and documentation (e.g., reports, lists, charts, indexes, codes) and technologies of control in and through metaphorizing, categorizing, ordering, classifying and hierarchicalizing. These ways of knowing help to discipline the other and the self by enframing issues and imposing rules of conduct. These processes of object formation and creating knowledge about the objects (e.g., universalization of the 'neoliberal market') help to redefine actors' identities, subjectivities and desires (e.g., 'global partnership', 'rational economic investors', 'flexible workers', 'happy consumers', 'ethical corporations'). These hegemonic identities are echoed and repetitively performed/enacted by international organizations/multinational corporations/transnational elites/individuals in their mundane institutional events and routine practices of everyday life (on finance, see Langley 2003; Sum 2004). This shared discoursing about practices means people 'come to understand their situation according to a similar language and logic' (Miller and Rose 1992: 184). An important
part of this institutional consolidation and production of shared understandings is the
effective embodiment of ideas and practices in the habitus (and hexis) of leaders and
led within relevant organizations. This shared behaviour ensnares both the actors
concerned and others in webs of commitment 'within which are articulated all those
dreams, schemes, strategies, and manoeuvres of authorities that seek to shape the
beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions by acting upon their will, their
circumstances or their environment' (Miller and Rose 1992: 175). For Jessop, such
articulation could bring about, in the longer term, structural coherence that supports
continual accumulation.

4.2 Production of Sub-hegemony

Central to the scalar nature of these genre chains are the ways in which these
'molecular processes' also stretch across the hegemonic and sub-hegemonic axis
(see diagram 2). Globalized symbols and discourses, especially those that originate
from entrepreneurs/academics/leaders in elite corporations/institutions, are
transferred to other scales and sites by regional/national/local leaders (e.g.,
intellectuals, politicians, bureaucrats and think tanks) who are trained to think through
elite theories and can 'speak the language' through years of studying abroad under
scholarship schemes, attending international conferences, collaborating in research,
reading academic and business bestsellers/reports, listening to CNN news, etc. Such
transfer often involves the regional/national/local intellectuals and institutions
negotiating the meanings of these discourses. They become active purveyors of
global economic discourse by making it relevant and anchoring it in specific
regional/national/local cultural contexts (Peet 2000; Sum 2003). In this regard, they
can be seen as sub-hegemonic nodes of translation of global trends and as centres
of persuasion that may contribute to local convergence. Martin-Barbero (1993) has
described this translation as the hegemonic echo. This sub-hegemonic echo is an
important locus of analysis because it can tell us about how ideological power is
legitimated and customized through local-contextual practice and common sense.
This echoing through translation and negotiation of hegemonic meanings may
involve extending, re-phrasing, hybridizing and technicalizing the meanings of
buzzwords that can be (re-)embedded in the regional/national/local contexts. Often,
these individuals and institutions are rewarded and status are conferred upon them in
line with how quickly the latest hegemonic discourse can be co-constructed,
repeated, re-thought and translated into regional/national/local policy, documents,
and the mundane practices of everyday life.

This extension, modification and hybridization of meanings, not without its tensions
and intrusions, may help to strengthen the overall consensus and transnational
alliance around the hegemonic project. This occurs through sub-hegemonic actors
offering varieties of interpretation that extend the hegemonic meanings but as yet can
be subsumed and contained within the hegemonic codes. Hegemony is fluid and
complex mix of ideas from various sources and scales. Sometimes, novel discourses
may emerge from these sub-hegemonic centres of power and reverberate back to
the hegemonic sites, where they are absorbed into the hegemonic codes (Peet
2000). These processes of ideological exchange reinforce the ties between
hegemonic and sub-hegemonic nodes. This suggests that there is a multiscalar inter-
discursive space where actors with global horizons of action interact with those with more regional/national/local horizons in continuously co-construction and negotiating the (sub-)hegemonic codes and practices of the 'integral world economic order'. This new 'word order' and associated practices represent a dominant 'worldview' that has an underlying structural class relevance as well as being ethnic-, gender- and place-biased. These codes and practices are naturalized as universal common sense through common ways of thinking, talking and performing. It is by creating such mutuality and reciprocity across different scales and sites that power becomes productive.\textsuperscript{11}

4.3 Production of Counter-Hegemony

Despite the appearance of social unity and consensus that successful hegemonic projects create, this is always an illusory unity. For successful hegemonic projects always involve the privileging of some identities and interests over others and thereby marginalize or exclude other identities and interests. This means that hegemony remains vulnerable both to material disruptions that heighten sensitivity to the identities and interests that have been oppressed or suppressed and to the voicing of alternative discourses and visions that represent the 'return of the oppressed' and suppressed. This involves not only those who lose out on class grounds but also those who are oppressed on gender, 'race', ethnic, territorial, and other grounds (Bakker 2003: 66-82). Thus there is a permanent potential for hegemonic instability and resistance range from tactics of resistance through a growing economic-corporate awareness to more developed forms of political consciousness of 'shared' exclusion and oppression and concerted and well-organized forms of resistance and on to a genuinely revolutionary counter-hegemonic position (cf. Gramsci 1971: 000-000). This provides both the space and the opportunity for different social forces to intervene in these struggles and give them a new form and content.

Genre chains work at this level too – creating the possibility of well-organized counter-hegemonic mobilization. These counter-hegemonic struggles have their bases in class, social movements and popular culture (see diagram 2). Social forces such as critical intellectuals, trade unions, movement-based NGOs, feminist/anti-racist groups, writers/journalists, grassroots workers/campaigners, alternative artists, peasants, and cyberpunks marked by class, ethnic and/or gender difference(s) often serve as spokespersons for alternative agendas at global, regional, national and local levels. They deploy 'wars of position' (non-violent confrontations) and 'wars of manoeuvre' (frontal assaults against the state) to resist hegemonic control. Agencies of resistance cut across global, regional, national and local levels and their activities can be found in different sites. They range from macro-resistance such as organized movements/forums to micro-resistance that can be found in the practices of everyday life. On the macro level, movements/forums are transnational protests (e.g., anti-globalization campaign in Seattle), alternative social forums (e.g., World Social Forum, European Social Forum) and (trans-)localized struggles (e.g., Zapatistas rebellion in Chiapas) in which Gill (2000) termed these transnational political agencies as 'postmodern prince'. These agencies of macro-resistance take part in mass demonstrations and transnational movements composed of a multitude of
forces and engaged in a variety of global-local struggles. They co-ordinate via the Internet and perform their resistance on the streets and other communal sites.

Associated but not exclusive to these loosely-organized movements are alternative media as a site of resistance. Organic intellectuals offer counter-hegemonic narratives and they are often published in books with alternative presses (e.g., Pluto Press, South End Press, Third World Network, Veinto Siglo, Zed Books), pamphlets, charters, forum testimonies, press releases, magazines, paintings, radios, films, graffiti, folklore, poems, songs, banners, chat rooms, open publishing on websites (e.g., Indymedia), and cyberwatch monitoring sites. Thus, the targeted oppositional readership/audienceship was provided with alternative symbols and means of receiving and imparting information that aim at social change. They are complex agents of counter-hegemonic power that use skills and sites belonging to communities normally excluded from mainstream modes of distribution.

As for the subaltern and the marginals who cannot escape the cultural milieu that marginalizes them, de Certeau discusses the practice of the ‘weak’ through the use of ‘tactics’ in everyday life. For him, tactics are used by those who lack solid institutional and/or spatial advantages and must therefore defend or promote their interests by engaging in a permanent ‘war of maneuver’ by seizing (or creating) opportunities and by using speed or time to throw entrenched powers off balance in order to gain what often prove to be merely temporary advantages. He argues that the oppressed must seek to insinuate themselves within that milieu in ways that produce transient victories — they must always be ‘on the watch for opportunities that must be seized "on the wing"’ (de Certeau 1982: 35). They must continually manipulate events in the system and be prepared to take short-term and decisive actions to gain a tactical advantage. Thus everyday life is a continuing battle of wits and a site of micro-resistance in which the unstructured activities of the liminal find expression (on ‘tactics of the weak’ in the information age, see Sum 2003).

Especially in times of hegemonic crisis, these counter-hegemonic discourses and macro-resistant practices (see diagram 2) are prone to (sub-)hegemonic intellectual capture and neutralization as radical intellectuals and subalterns are co-opted by grants, institutional recognition, partnership, and invited visits to the global heartland of ‘worldview’ production. Their views and criticisms are absorbed into mainstream discourses in a process analogous to ‘passive revolution’. This absorption and incorporation of counter-hegemonic elements from different scales and sites allows the dominant group to secure the consent of the subalterns. This negotiation process involves either the de-radicalizing of the alternative worldview and absorbing it into a modified version of the dominant worldview (Gramsci 1971: 279-318); or by humanizing the dominant worldview into something more like the alternative worldview by injecting stronger ethico-political elements that stress rights, social-ethical responsibility or partnership (on finance, see Sum 2004). Given the negotiated nature of this process, hegemony is reproduced through accommodating the interests of the subalterns within the existing social relations. Although hegemony seeks to incorporate subaltern groups within the existing order, the negotiated nature of hegemony means that this incorporation is never complete and complete and the production of hegemony is a continual struggle to create consensus for a system that favours certain dominant interests.
5. Conclusion

This chapter has suggested one way to introduce the 'cultural' and 'spatial' turns into the study of IPE. By analogy with Gramsci's idea of 'integral state', it deploys the term 'integral world economic order' which can be understood as production order + civil society that is characterized by a relatively stable structured coherence whose dominance is reproduced on a global scale. This structured coherence is formed through the intermeshing of the hegemony of production and the production of hegemony in mutually supportive ways that limit the contradictions inherent in capitalist production within and secure a limited measure of social integration. A full analysis of the 'integral world economic order' should include analyses of hegemony of production and production of hegemony as well as their coevolution. Given the limitation of space, this chapter has one-sidedly focused on the discursive selectivity of the 'production of hegemony' by drawing mainly on neo-Gramscians' work such as Jessop, Fairclough and de Certeau. More specifically, it identifies the key role of genre chains that connect different scales and degrees of hegemony and counter-hegemony and suggests how they are supported both structurally and discursively. In general, although the network of strategic organic intellectuals in genre chains is constrained by structural hierarchies, there is still variable scope for strategic calculation and action. The strategic-relational approach examines both the representational and material aspects of world economic order and their mediation by elite and subaltern networks of actors. They engage in a continually renegotiated construction of hegemony across different sites and scales.

This chapter has highlighted a double negotiation process in the study of cultural IPE. For, on the one hand, there is negotiation between hegemonic and sub-hegemonic actors over the hegemonic 'word order' and its instantiation on different scales and sites. In some cases, the sub-hegemonic actors largely relay global discourse and thereby function as nodes of persuasion at regional/national/local levels. But they may also develop novel discourses that reverberate back from these sub-hegemonic centres of power to the core hegemonic sites and get absorbed into the hegemonic codes. Indeed, effective hegemony typically depends on the co-participation of (sub-)hegemonic actors in building genre chains and co-constructing the latest hegemonic discourses. As we have seen, this involves a wide range of discourses and genres, ranging from abstract theories, explanations and reasons for conduct through technical codes, standards, and indexes to more emotional, experiential, and moral discourses. These can be translated into many different forms of consensus and self-rule -- armoured, as Gramsci rightly notes, by coercion and, as Foucault notes, by various disciplinary practices too. This complex interactive achievement of building consensus and moral leadership is central to Gramsci's thinking. For hegemony is not 'false consciousness' or a simple top-down indoctrination. It is always produced in and through political, intellectual, and moral leadership and the skilful (or, at least, fortuitously successful) granting of material concessions according to the current situation and balance of forces. Only thus can common ways of thinking, talking, and performing be consolidated, at least for a time. Thus hegemony is achieved through recurrent molecular phases and interactions that, together with material concessions and the judicious use of force, produce an 'unstable equilibrium of compromise' from
which there emerges a 'collective will of a certain level of homogeneity'. With the benefit of a discourse perspective on the production of hegemony, we can envisage how such unstable equilibria come about through dynamic interaction within and across hegemonic and sub-hegemonic sites and scales.

On the other hand, however, we must also consider the negotiation that occurs between (sub-)hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. The formation of a 'popular collective will' can never be complete because there are always excluded or marginalized forces, both within a given social formation and beyond it. This provides a permanent reservoir of resistance and a permanent potential for the development of counter-hegemony on different scales and sites. This is most noticeable in periods of crisis, especially when the crisis involves more than limited economic issues and is translated into the political and ideological spheres. In these circumstances dominant groups can either seek to recuperate hegemony by negotiating with the subalterns and/or resort to brute force. Where this leads to a successful recuperation of an institutionalized compromise without serious threat to fundamental social relations, we can talk, with Gramsci, of a 'passive revolution'. But such a re-regularization of the social order may prove impossible and then the outcome could be continuous macro- and micro-resistance in the making of the integral world economic (dis-)order.

**Bibliography**


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1 This account of cultural IPE concentrates more on the consensual than the coercive and imperialist aspects of hegemony. A similar emphasis can also be found in Cox's work (1987).

2 From the perspective of a regulation approach, the hegemony of production can be referred to as the dominance of a production order or accumulation regime (e.g., Fordism) within the overall structure of a social formation (in this case on a global scale) and to its underpinning by a mode of regulation that secures and reproduces this dominance.

3 This chapter rests on a sympathetic critique of the Coxian approach. In general, this approach can be criticized as: a) being too top-down and structural-institutional in orientation; b) paying insufficient attention to Gramsci's work on civil society and the popular; c) neglecting the ideological dissemination of hegemonic discourses in civil society; and d) ignoring the interactive and negotiated nature of hegemony. There is a turn towards culture in Cox's later work ([1]) but they take more a 'civilizational' direction than an ideational/common-sensical perspective.

4 The term 'gramscianizing Foucault' was first used by Harris (1992: 156).

5 Despite these criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe's work, their Gramscian conceptualization of the constitution of hegemony through a process of articulation is useful. The latter examines these relations of domination as somewhat open-ended and contingent upon various elements of the social, integrating to construct a partial stability that is always in danger of being ruptured. In addition, in the social field of
discursivity, there are 'nodal points' that attempt to refix a centre of meaning and action.

6 The following paragraphs draw heavily on Jessop (2004).
7 These moments are presented in a particular order; but there is no reason why they need to apply as such.

10 Gramsci's hegemony especially highlights the business of ensnaring others. By contrast, Foucault and Rose foreground the idea of people ensnaring themselves. In order to put the self back into the Gramsci's equation of hegemony, Foucault's concept of governmentality and Rose's talk of power and rule enrich the grid of power as an emerging reflexivity about and control of self.
11 The discussion thus far concentrates on the making of economic consensus and the interactions between different scales. Space constraints mean that I cannot discuss the Frankfurt School and British Cultural Studies here. These schools concentrate mainly on other cultural sites such cultural/pleasure industries, consumer cultures and the built environment that are important in the constructions and negotiations of hegemony (Kellner 2002: 31-58; Jenkins 2003: 65-85).